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Introduction 
My starting point is the so-called return 
to reality of Italian narrative in recent 
years. I am going to give just a few 
examples of works that exemplify this 
still ongoing phenomenon, but the list 
could be much longer. Cronache italiane 
as well as Occhio per occhio by Sandro 
Veronesi both came out in 1992; Fattacci 
by Vincenzo Cerami was released in 
1997, and L’abusivo by Antonio Franchini 
in 2001. I should also mention Gomorra 
by Roberto Saviano, released in 2006, 
which is the most famous – although not 
necessarily the most important – book of 
the group. These are indisputably very 
different works, nonetheless they share 
some crucial features: from the thematic 
point of view, these are all books 
focusing on present times and society 
(‘realism of the dictum’); from a stylistic 
point of view, all these works challenge 
the form of the novel, blurring the 
boundaries between fiction and 
nonfiction. Moreover, all these novels 
revive a figure that seemed irremediably 
lost, that of the engagé writer. 
However, speaking of engaged literature 
today involves considerable difficulties, 
chief among them issues of terminology. 
The term impegno, ‘engagement’, is in 
fact strictly intertwined, especially in Italy, 
with a specific period – from the end of 
World War Two to the mid Sixties – and 
with a discourse deeply rooted in 
Marxism; a discourse whose influence is 
today at the very least weakened. It is 
therefore necessary to state at the outset 
that speaking of engaged literature today 
entails taking stock of a gap between the 
present and a historical period that is 
long gone. It comes as no surprise 
therefore that the eight novel-writers 
examined by the journal Allegoria in 
2008 reject any comparison between 
their work and that of the Neorealist 
writers, even polemically critiquing the 
idea of a possible influence of literature 
on reality. Giuseppe Genna, for example, 
ironically comments on the démodée 
figure of the writer-demagogue, while 
Nicola Lagioia quotes almost literally 
Clov in Fin de Partie, stating: ‘still bearing 
an effect on reality? Ah, this is a good 
one!’ (see Genna 2008: 14; Lagioia 2008: 
17). 
However, the current rejection of ‘out-
dated’ expressions of political 
engagement does not mean completely 
cutting off the connection between 
literature and politics, but rather refusing 
the ideological connotations associated 
with it. When questioned on the topic, 
Bruno Arpaia immediately stated that 
‘the connections between the writer and 
the political avant-gardes are today 
impossible, simply because these avant-
gardes do not exist anymore and are not 
even imaginable in this day and age’ 
(Arpaia 2008: 73). He nonetheless 
suggests the idea of a coinvolto writer 
(we can roughly translate it with 
‘involved’), whose duty is to ‘disclose the 
lies hidden in words, especially those 
words spoken by power’ (Arpaia 2008: 
73). 
Arpaia’s words are very clear, but they 
take us into a minefield: opposing lies 
means establishing truth, and truth is 
anything but an easy concept. What 
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possible truth are we speaking of? For a 
first, partial answer, we shall look at the 
novel of Javier Cercas – a work 
introduced in Italy by Arpaia himself – 
Anatomía de un istante. The topic of the 
novel is the military coup d’état of 
February 23, 1981 in Spain, and in 
particular the figure of Prime Minister 
Suarez, who refused to abandon the 
presidential chair even when threatened 
by Colonel Tejero and his thugs. This is a 
well-known fact, at least in Spain. Why, 
then, one might ask, should it be made 
the subject of a novel? And, maybe even 
more importantly, how – in which form – 
should it be narrated? The answers we 
seek come from the theoretical Prologue 
to the novel: it is necessary to recount 
the event once again in opposition to the 
oversimplified version that the mass-
media have continuously broadcast. 
The event, Cercas writes, has already 
become a ‘rodomontade slipped out of 
the poisoned brain of a mediocre 
imitator of Luis Berlanga’ (Cercas 2010: 
12). The first and unavoidable duty of the 
novelist is therefore to restore, by means 
of his narration, the complexity and 
seriousness of the event. The answer to 
the question of why to tell the story 
relates to the matter how it is told. 
Cercas’s discussion starts off by taking 
into account that in today’s society of 
communication (see Perniola 2004) the 
roles of informative nonfiction and novel 
writing have been turned almost upside 
down: mass media communication has 
indeed appropriated two main qualities 
of the novel, the emotional and the 
fictional. If, as Cercas states, each and 
any historical event is turned by mass 
media communication into a ‘collective 
romance’, the socially aware writer 
cannot, and should not, add another 
fiction to the already fictionalized story of 
the mass media but, more unassumingly, 
‘discover what is the real story and 
scrupulously report it’ (Cercas 2010: 21-
22).  
Cercas’s example is representative of the 
broader phenomenon with which we 
began: the flourishing, in Italy, of 
narratives dealing with specific social 
issues by means of hybrid forms 
consciously mixing fiction and non-
fiction. These should be read first of all 
as a reaction to the fictionalization of 
reality promoted by mass-media. 
Is this a step back, a belittlement of the 
genre? Quoting the first of Eliot’s Four 
Quartets, the Italian critic Andrea 
Cortellessa polemically affirmed that 
‘humankind cannot bear very much 
reality’. I think, however, that today’s 
problem is exactly the opposite, and that 
the question we should be asking is 
rather: how much more exoticism and 
inaccuracy can we still bear? Advocating 
for a novel that discusses real social and 
historical problems means neither 
reducing it to a simple chronicle of 
events, nor endorsing the idea of the 
novel as ancilla historiae. 
 
Hybrid novels and history 
At this point I would like to distinguish 
between documentary novels and what I 
propose to call hybrid novels. Whereas 
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the first simply aim to chronicle facts in 
order to check their truth and eventually 
rectify vulgate interpretations of them, 
hybrid novels start by chronicling 
historical facts but transcend mere facts 
in order to convey a deeper, archetypical 
meaning of human history. Such novels 
dare to have it both ways: on the one 
hand they respond to reality, and 
therefore can be read as history books, 
on the other hand, they do not renounce 
responding to the novelistic genre: as 
Javier Cercas has written, they ‘are not 
completely novels’ but still want to be 
read also as such (Cercas 2010: 23-24, 
my italics). 
Establishing a direct relationship 
between the novel and the 
historiographic discourse, Cercas puts us 
in a minefield yet again. Theories that 
have sought to demonstrate the shared 
properties of historiographic and 
novelistic discourse have had great 
success in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, thanks in part to Hayden White’s 
elaborations on the topic in Tropics of 
Discourse and the subsequent The 
Content of Form. Demolishing the myth 
of historical objectivity, White went so far 
as to affirm that ‘seen simply as verbal 
artifacts, historiographic narrations and 
novels are indistinguishable one from the 
other’ (White 1978: 112).  
Hyper-constructivists and postmodern 
attempts to eliminate the distinction 
between fictional and historical tales of 
this kind have been strongly contested. 
Carlo Ginzburg, for instance, has focused 
attention on the very different relation to 
the source material obtained when 
sources are understood as ‘proof’. Unlike 
what the novelist has to deal with, they 
represent an insuperable limit to the 
subjectivity of the narrator historian, 
thereby also guaranteeing the scientific 
reputation of his discourse, as well as his 
credibility, (see Ginzburg 2000). The 
same distinction is also central in Dorrit 
Cohn’s pointed narratological analysis, 
when she underlines that the novelist’s 
relation to his sources is ‘free, remains 
tacit, or when mentioned is assumed to 
be spurious’: 
In this respect the process that 
transforms archival sources into 
narrative history is qualitatively 
different from (and indeed hardly 
comparable to) the process that 
transforms a novelist’s source […]. 
The novelist’s relation to his sources 
is free, remains tacit, or, when 
mentioned, is assumed to be 
spurious; its true origination may 
(and often does) remain forever 
unknown – sometimes to the writer 
himself. (Cohn  1999: 114-15) 
The point is incisive. Even without 
considering the extreme case of 
Gomorra, with not one footnote or 
bibliographical index, it is clear that the 
elaboration of the sources (their ‘free 
use’, if not their ‘unknown origin’) is one 
of the primary characteristics also of 
hybrid novels. In these narrations the 
sources (almost) never constitute proof 
from a ‘scientific’ point of view.  
There are two other key indicators, in 
Cohn’s view, that clearly distinguish the 
fictional from the non-fictional tale: 1. the 
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possibility of discovering a discrepancy 
between the ‘norms explicitly stated by 
the narrator and [those] that belong to 
the author and remain implicit’; and 2. 
the presence of an omniscient narrator, 
or one able to explicate the thoughts of 
each character (see Cohn 1999: 129 and 
passim).  
Let us pause for a moment on the first 
point: the difference between the actual 
author and the narrator. This view is 
certainly justified, but in my mind it has 
two weak points: 
1. The ambiguity of the norms or 
values attributed to the author 
which, precisely because they are 
implicit, have to be deductively 
recovered and in any case remain 
difficult to verify.  
2. In line with the most rigid 
structuralist and narratological 
analyses, Cohn’s analysis posits a 
hyper-reader informed not only 
about the (unclear) values of the 
author, but inclined to verify them 
by constantly comparing them 
with those of the narrator.  
Cohn’s objection works perfectly at the 
theoretical level, especially if one ignores 
the fact that the addressee of a narration 
is always a reader: someone who instead 
of dissecting the text merges with it. I do 
not mean to argue that the novelist’s 
discourse is subsumable into that of the 
historian. It is not a question, therefore, 
of refuting Cohn’s analysis (which I 
happen to find, for the most part, 
convincing), but rather of shifting the 
point of view and identifying the means 
adopted today to guarantee the authority 
of a narrative, not for a highly specialized 
reader, but for that vaster public that any 
text purporting to be ‘engaged’ or civic 
must necessarily presuppose.  
The most widely adopted method to 
certify the truth of the facts recounted in 
the novel involves using the 
autobiographical model in order to 
construct a narrative with the 
characteristics of a witness story. The 
distance between the real author (an 
actual person) and narrator (a character) 
is systematically reduced to a minimum 
(even if, as in the case of Siti’s work, that 
distance does not always disappear 
entirely). One of the principal (and most 
evident) signs characteristic of fictional 
narrative is thus removed and the 
‘identity between author, narrator, and 
protagonist constitutes the certification 
of the content’s veracity’ (Iovinelli 2004: 
255). 
The autobiographical method is 
particularly popular with authors who 
tend to present themselves as 
intellectuals more than novelists. Here 
the explicit statements of a narrator and 
the implicit convictions of an author 
coincide (almost) perfectly. (We shall see 
this later, when discussing Gomorra). 
Generally, it is rare to find the description 
of thoughts that are not traceable to the 
narrator, since he limits himself to what 
he has personally experienced. As 
Meneghello put it in a note to I piccoli 
maestri, the author writes ‘with the 
authority of he who speaks of what he 
knows, and only of what he knows’ 
(Meneghello 2006: 615). Moreover: the 
example of I piccoli maestri – ‘written 
with an explicitly civic and cultural 
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purpose’, namely ‘to express a way of 
seeing the Resistance in a rather 
different way from the popularized view, 
in a register that is anti-rhetorical and 
anti-heroic’ – shows that the novel is 
often the rival, rather than the vicar of 
history (Meneghello 614: 615). As 
Coetzee has reminded us, by shaping 
historical facts according to its own 
‘paradigms and myths’ the novel 
‘demythologizes history’, showing it to be 
only one of a number of discourses on 
reality and not the thing itself (Coetzee 
1998: 4). 
This rivalry is all the more necessary 
whenever and wherever historical 
discourse finds itself controlled by power, 
and is therefore highly ideological. 
Rethinking the historical record by 
starting from objective (verifiable) facts, 
the novel arrives at conclusions that are 
not ‘checkable by history as a child’s 
schoolwork is checked by a 
schoolmistress’ (Coetzee 1998: 4). It 
might provide a different explanation of a 
specific event, but at the same time, and 
at a more profound level, it manages to 
shed light on the connection between 
the facts and something universal.  
In the end, any discourse on the 
question of fiction and history ends up 
reformulating. And, as Aristotle contends 
in the ninth book of the Poetics, ‘poetry 
rests on a more theoretical basis’ and is 
more important than history because 
‘poetry speaks of universals and history 
of particulars’ (9, 51b). Today, however, 
the constant tension between reality and 
fiction that one finds in hybrid novels has 
little to do with verisimilitude. Many of 
the texts in question claim to present 
things not as ‘they could take place’ (9, 
51b) but as they have actually taken 
place. Nonetheless, when the documents 
are manifestly insufficient to the 
illustration of some deeper truth, the 
novelist turns to imagination while 
conferring upon it the status of truth by 
deploying a variety of reality effects.  
 
Imagining real facts 
My discourse seems to suffer here a 
paradoxical impasse: the novelist is 
imagined to imagine a fact that has truly 
happened. The oxymoron, or aporia, 
however, no longer exists if we consider 
that in this context imagination is not 
opposed to reality, but to brute fact (and 
the emphasis is on the adjective). To 
imagine means here to shape facts so 
that a meaning can emerge from them. 
The real distinction is not between facts 
and fiction, but between facts and truth, 
since facts can exist without human 
intelligence, but truth cannot. Danilo Kis 
saw this perhaps better than anyone 
else: the novelist can go as far as 
imagining a historical document, but he 
cannot invent/imagine history; he can 
falsify his proofs but only to ‘identify 
again, through his imagination, a 
historical reality’. The appendix of 
documents therefore becomes what he 
calls ‘the frame and the recipient’ of the 
novel, but the imagined part of it is never 
arbitrary. Rather, it represents a plus of 
beauty and critical thinking.  
I would also like to stress that memory 
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and imagination are – in the novel as 
well as even in our daily experience – 
strictly intertwined. Focusing on the 
limited point of view of the 
autobiographical narrator, and 
underlying the unreliability of his 
discourse, some of the best hybrid 
stories reveal both a fundamental feature 
of the novel, as well as the mechanisms 
involved in the construction of 
experience through memory. 
In Gli ultimi italiani di Kobarid by Antonio 
Franchini, the autobiographical narrator 
recounts the life of Gobbo and Rossi, the 
last Italians to remain in Caporetto after 
the annexation of Italian territories in the 
former Yugoslavia. The narrator’s 
attention focuses on what seems like a 
marginal detail that is actually of great 
lyrical power. On those rare occasions 
that Gobbo spent the night in the city, he 
would fall asleep drunk on the parapet of 
the bridge of Napoleon, thus risking 
falling into the river upon awakening. 
Gobbo would say, ‘tomorrow I’ll fall one 
way or the other’ only to ‘always fall on 
the side of the street’. At the end, 
however, the reader finds out that there 
is little truth to the story and that the 
author actually might have ‘made it all 
up’ (Franchini 2008: 82-83). ‘Many things’, 
the narrator says, ‘I had dreamt, many 
things indeed I had misinterpreted up 
there’ (Franchini 2008: 83). This 
demonstration of the unreliability of the 
narrator and the mechanisms of 
memory in the construction of 
experience, casts an ambiguous light on 
all the facts in the story, only to finally 
redound as an affirmation of the truth of 
the ‘dreamt story’: 
Però a quel punto anch’io non 
capivo [...] se continuava a negare 
voleva dire che ero stato io a 
figurarmi tutto. Come poteva essere 
accaduto, come potevo essermi 
inventato di sana pianta un episodio 
tanto preciso? Avrei voluto dirgli, 
pensa che l’abbia sognato? Molte 
cose, in effetti, avevo sognato, o 
travisato, in quel luogo. E la storia 
sognata non finisce con l’essere 
vera quanto quella reale? Ma questo 
non si sa, di fatto, ed è una vecchia 
questione, signor Cimprič. (Franchini 
2008: 83-4)  
It only remains to note that the 
equivalence affirmed here is one of 
quantity and not of quality: the imagined 
story is as true as the real one. What 
matters, from a novelistic point of view, is 
the symbolic power of the image, and 
the story is more true the more it is able 
to shed light on the human meaning of 
experience rather than mirroring facts 
through an impossible objectivity.  
This is even clearer in Franchini’s first 
novel L’abusivo. The novel recounts the 
story of the murder of Giancarlo Siani, 
the journalist of Il Mattino. Here Franchini 
diligently copies all the official 
documents and police reports of the 
murder, but the core of his novel – its 
truth – relies on the symbolic power of 
an image, and the existential power of 
the simple reflection promoted by that 
image: 
Il pensiero elementare, quello che 
slitta in zone remote della 
percezione, è immaginare di stare 
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parcheggiando sotto casa quando 
sentiamo esploderci la testa. Quanto 
dura? Quanto dolore c’è? Quanta 
consapevolezza? Qualche volta ci 
penso, quando parcheggio sotto 
casa: ora spengo il motore e mi 
scoppia la testa. Uno dovrebbe 
immaginarsi solo questo, quando 
pensa a una storia così o ad altre 
simili, storie fatte per essere 
esumate ogni tanto e poi archiviate 
perché la memoria non le può 
contenere tutte. Nell’intrecciarsi 
della loro trama, gli omicidi che 
talvolta si ricordano per sollevare le 
più svariate questioni finiscono col 
nascondere la considerazione più 
semplice, che un corpo si è rotto 
per mano di qualcuno e che 
somministrare la morte è 
un’indecenza. (Franchini 2001: 70) 
This passage by Franchini succeeds in 
linking, like only (excellent) literature can, 
three different elements, or points of 
view: the private (that is to say, the 
experience of the author/narrator), the 
universal (the fear of death that anyone 
feels), and the civic, since it forces the 
reader to rethink the real murder of 
Giancarlo Siani not as an aesthetic 
element of the novel but from a moral 
point of view. In L’Abusivo there is a very 
strict continuity between the auto-
biographical narration of the narrator’s 
familial story and the ‘journalistic’ story 
of Siani’s death. The contiguity is such 
that when the narrator reflects upon the 
death of the journalist he uses the same 
fatalistic words (‘Che nce vole a murì, ce 
vo’ tanto e nun ce vo’ niente’) that serve 
as the leitmotif of both the mother and 
the grandmother. Stripped of the 
mimesis of the dialect and pronounced 
in a different context, these words come 
to acquire at once concreteness and 
tragedy: they recall death as the destiny 
of every man, but incarnate this destiny 
in the concrete existence of the 
journalist Siani:  
Che ci vuole a morire. Ci vuole tanto 
e ci vuole niente. Sotto casa 
l’avevano aspettato a lungo, 
fumando sigarette dalle cui cicche 
si poté risalire alla marca, Merit, i 
filtri con la riga d’oro, e pisciando 
quando ne avevano voglia, davanti a 
testimony. (Franchini 2001: 65) 
In L’Abusivo Siani’s homicide stops being 
mere news that fails to touch upon the 
lives of those who remain since the 
autobiographical fiction makes the story 
part of ‘a human journey (“real” and 
“historical”)’ (Casadei 2007: 130). 
Therefore, the purpose of Franchini’s tale 
is not to discover some alternative truth 
to the one that has emerged during the 
trial. Instead, precisely because it 
develops, as Coetzee wished the novel 
would, the ‘paradigms and myths’ proper 
to novelistic discourse, it manages to 
safeguard the truthful representation of 
the facts as well as show their archetypal 
nature (Coetzee 1998: 4).  
This declension of the universal through 
the concrete and the historical is a 
constant feature in Franchini’s writing. He 
always begins with everyday acts and 
objects and through them he is capable 
of seeing human destiny. It is with this 
recognition that the writing begins. This 
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process is evident, for example, in the 
already cited Gli ultimi due italiani di 
Kobarid: 
Pipe, cartoline, specchietti e pettini, 
queste «futili cose» rese ormai 
preziose dal tempo e dall’essere 
appartenute a uomini scomparsi, 
stavano a decine anche nelle teche 
di Mirko, assieme a tirapugni, 
pugnali, spaccacuori e mazze 
chiodate e agli altri atroci attrezzi 
che testimoniavano come 
l’alternanza della luce e dell’ombra, 
in ogni aspetto della nostra vita, non 
fosse soltanto l’ipotesi di una logica 
astratta ma un costante dato 
naturale. (Franchini 2008: 79) 
The rivalry between history and novel of 
which Coetzee has spoken is, therefore, 
a crucial element for hybrid novels: not 
only because they freely interpret real 
facts, but most of all because the 
interpreting imagination of the novel 
becomes the bridge linking a factual 
reality to a human and existential truth. 
In this sense, recourse to 
autobiographical models can only be 
formal: the ‘I’ that recounts the story 
always coincides with the author only 
partially. The most striking example of 
this is without doubt Walter Siti’s Troppi 
paradisi: the identity/difference between 
author and narrator is announced in the 
opening line, ‘Mi chiamo Walter Siti (the 
narrator coincides with the author), 
come tutti’ (I am not the author, I am the 
typical man, specifically the western 
man). That is why it is more appropriate 
to speak of autofiction rather than 
autobiography where, as Siti states, the ‘I’ 
functions as ‘an exclusively literary 
artifact […] as a pretext: the ‘I’ in that 
case is nothing more than a particularly 
sensitive instrument serving to 
undermine stereotypes of reality by 
starting from what one knows best’ (Siti 
2000: 8). It matters little whether or not 
the events recounted actually coincide 
with those experienced, since the 
author’s ‘I’ must always try to attain to 
the generality of the ‘we’. It must become 
a sociological ‘I’. The true or feigned ‘I’, 
but more often than not the true and 
feigned ‘I’, becomes ‘a sort of robot, or 
clone, sent forth on a mission of 
reconnaissance where the territory is 
contaminated’ (Siti 2006: 45). The world 
becomes ‘a gnoseological effect’ 
constructed by the ‘I’ as ‘equivalent to 
the Cartesian cogito’ (Siti and Simonetti 
2003: 161 and passim).  
 
Gomorra’s case  
In the case of Roberto Saviano’s 
Gomorra, the construction of the ‘I’ 
exceeds the limits of the written page 
and is put into practice in many, if not 
all, spheres of communication available 
today. Taking up Foucault’s use of the 
concept of parresia (see Foucault 1996), 
Carla Benedetti has analyzed the last 
works of Pasolini and, subsequently, 
Saviano’s Gomorra. Pasolini is certainly a 
sort of authorizing father figure for 
Saviano. The possibility of writing and 
testimony depends on a sort of 
‘investiture from a distance’ that the 
author receives during his pilgrimage to 
the tomb of the poet. We shall notice, 
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however, that Saviano directly quotes the 
‘I know’ by Pasolini only to radically 
change the end of it. Where Pasolini says 
‘I know but I have no proofs’, ‘I know, 
because I am an intellectual’, Saviano 
states: ‘I know and I have proofs’. Saviano 
knows that being an intellectual is 
almost irrelevant today, and therefore he 
needs to give proofs to the readers. The 
need that Saviano feels to prove his 
discourse through means other than his 
novelistic imagination reveals a 
fundamental (probably irreversible) 
change of the figure of the intellectual. In 
fact, the figure of the intellectual was 
born with the J’accuse by Emile Zola on 
January 13 1889, and had been since 
then exactly the figure of ‘whom who 
knows but has no proof’.  
In Benedetti’s reading, Pasolini’s ‘I know’, 
just like Saviano’s own, are the words of 
a parresiastes – the one who exposes 
himself in the first person and exercises 
his liberty to speak the truth regardless 
of the risks that this entails. Remarking 
this is no doubt pertinent, but requires, 
in my view, further elaboration. 
Discourse and Truth in Ancient Greece, 
clearly shows how the figure of the 
parresiastes changes function and status 
depending on the time: the enunciation 
of truth does not have the same effect, 
nor the same function, in different 
historical, social, and political contexts. In 
a democracy, for instance, the 
parresiastic function can be easily 
confused with the political battle or 
factionalism. In fact, Foucault points out 
that Isocrates maintained that parresia 
and democracy are incompatible (see 
Foucault 1996: 37-45).  
One should also notice that truth is not a 
stable given that is acquired and then 
simply spoken. It involves, rather, the 
complex relations of force between 
different knowledge-power correlates in 
society – ‘a whole set of procedures 
regulated by production, codifying, 
dividing up, the circulation and 
functioning of enunciations’ (Foucault 
1994: 113). It is necessary to avoid a 
mythologizing perspective (which, it 
seems to me, Benedetti’s reading does 
not completely do). In contemporary 
society the real problem of the 
parresiastes is to be heard (or listened 
to).  
Among contemporary authors Saviano is 
the one that most closely resembles the 
‘classic’ models of the intellectual as the 
antithesis of the ‘anonymous functionary 
or careful bureaucrat’ (Said 1996: 13). He 
understood that what the intellectual 
does is a performance: the actorial 
techniques he uses to deliver his words 
are – or can be – even more important 
than their truth. Saviano has all along 
presented himself not as a novelist, but 
as an intellectual for whom the novel is 
only one and not the only possible form 
of expression. The narrator of Gomorra is 
therefore not a novelistic double of its 
author (none of the Sitian ambiguity), but 
the extension of his voice in so far as he 
is speaking as a public persona. More so 
than a novel, Gomorra is actually a 
peroration in written form: part of a more 
comprehensive discourse through which 
the intellectual Roberto Saviano 
attempts, in a Foucauldian way, to 
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change the laws of the production of 
truth from within a given community. 
In the text itself, the construction of 
identity is achieved primarily through the 
verisimilar representation of the body 
and its reactions to stimuli; the body 
reacquires veracity and specificity 
because it is the signifier of the presence 
in the world of the author-narrator and 
his engagement in what is recounted. 
Consequently, the body is not estranged 
as an object of knowledge, instead it is 
assumed to be a knowing subject. 
The use of the body as an instrument of 
knowledge, with all its imperfections and 
lacks, excludes a priori the possibility of 
perfect knowledge of the logic-Cartesian 
sort. On the other hand, however, it 
functions as a guarantee of narrative 
sincerity because words seem to erupt 
naturally from sensation, unfiltered 
through intellectual or class prejudice. If 
Franchini in Quando vi ucciderete, 
maestro? speaks of a ‘very direct and 
exposed’ link between ‘a man’s sheath of 
flesh and his thoughts’, in Gomorra the 
tendency to represent emotions and, 
more generally, abstract situations in 
corporeal terms is linked to the principle 
that information or interpretation can be 
inexact or misused, whereas the body 
does not lie: 
as if there were something in the 
body that alerts you when you are 
faced with the true. With all the 
senses. Without mediation. A truth 
that has not been told, reported, 
photographed, but which all the 
same is given to you (Saviano 2006: 
151) 
In so far as it appeals to a shared 
humanity and to a creaturely fragility, the 
representation of the body is also what 
allows a glimpse of the person behind 
the literary character. It is that which 
grounds the possibility for contact 
between the represented experience and 
the experience of the reader. ‘[I] speak of 
skin, and shame’, explains Edoardo 
Albinati in his novel Maggio selvaggio; ‘I 
cannot conceive of another meaning to 
brotherhood but an openness to bodily 
fragility’ (quoted in Donati et al. 1999: 42).  
 
Problems of style (and ethics)  
The body’s experience comes across in 
these texts through a set of reality effects 
deployed to create the illusion of words 
that exclude any hyper-literary play and 
mystification, and for which the ‘speaking 
as a man to other men’ that Gadda saw 
in Manzoni could still be an ideal and 
non-constraining model (ethical more so 
than aesthetic) (see Gadda 1991: 680).  
This refusal of artificiality in language 
goes hand in hand, with a belief in the 
communicability of experience and the 
possibility that it can become part of a 
communal patrimony. ‘Never trust 
exclusively in the aesthetic gesture’ is the 
dictate that Saviano finds in Vittorio de 
Seta’s documentaries (Saviano 2009: 45). 
If it already seems an established fact 
that the Italian narratives of today have 
left behind the weight of tradition, 
especially where tradition applies to 
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language, then the challenge for today’s 
engaged narrator is to find a simple style, 
to guarantee above all else the efficacy 
of his communication. As E. W. Said has 
reminded us, an intellectual’s message 
is, after all, always ‘for a public’ (Said 
1996: 11, my italics). Or, put in Primo 
Levi’s simple words: ‘we must not write 
as if we were alone’ (Levi 1985: 53). This 
is also a key point in Raffaele La Capria’s 
lucid pamphlet La mosca nella bottiglia, 
where he argues that the abandonment 
of common sense that guides the boat 
of reason has led, in the course of the 
twentieth-century, to an estrangement of 
art from life and its (necessary) public so 
that ‘today it seems that art, rather than 
addressing a public, requires only the 
participation of those who are 
knowledgeable about the artwork. And 
thus art for art’s sake has become art for 
artists’ (La Capria 2003: 1393; 1398).  
To return to clarity (like Levi), or to 
common sense (like La Capria), is 
anything but a banal undertaking. By 
foregrounding the responsibility of the 
spoken word, these appeals clear the 
ground of all ‘ivory tower’ romanticism, 
definitively refuting the image of an artist 
free of History. Levi’s simplicity, in the 
same way as La Capria’s common sense, 
cannot and should not be understood in 
terms of a lack of complexity (in fact, Levi 
had spoken of argumentative clarity). 
Both discourses share the conviction 
that ‘somewhere there is a truth’ and it is 
the task of the intellectual to utter it, 
even at the cost of estranging oneself 
from those groups that hold power. In 
fact, the intellectual as such ‘prefers, to 
begin with, non-belonging and 
estrangement, disidentification and 
distance’ (La Capria 2003: 1419;1453). Is 
this a sterile morality? I do not believe so, 
and I would like to support my stance 
recalling Montaigne’s Apology of 
Raymond Sebond: to the contrary of any 
Grand Theory, not only does a minimalist 
ethics produce no suffering, it actually 
contributes to the general well-being by 
acting as a corrective to dogmatism and 
intolerance.  
And yet, even this mechanism is always 
at the point of breakdown. Common 
sense can seem ingenuous and become 
‘good sense’ (‘a self-defensive and 
bourgeois attitude’). Even the clarity of 
language is capable of deterioration into 
the banality of stereotypes found in 
journalistic communication, especially 
televised journalism. If there is ‘a point in 
our narrative where civil engagement 
and tourism dangerously border one 
another’ (Simonetti 2006: 131), these can 
still be distinguished by their different 
ways of representing suffering.  
The writer must try to avoid falling victim 
to that perverse mechanism that, in 
Susan Sontag’s analysis, governs the 
production of images: if the real horror is 
not shocking enough for the spectator, it 
must then be artificially heightened by 
stressing the most horrifying detail (and 
thus exhibiting a piece of information 
that is ‘unnecessary, indecent’), or even 
by way of an outright reenactment or 
theatricalization that intensifies the 
horrific and the grotesque (see Sontag 
2003: 63-64). Just as in war photography 
and its emphasis on detail, there is a 
certain novelistic representation of pain 
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that says at the same time both ‘stop 
this’ and ‘what a spectacle!’ (Sontag 
2003: 77). The task of literature must 
then be to reflect upon a thing instead of 
showing it, promoting reflection rather 
than creating shock.  
In literature, preterition can be worth a 
thousand descriptions because it avoids 
the romanticism (better yet, the 
sentimentalism) of the image’s 
hyperrealism, creating instead a space 
for the reader’s imagination and 
reflection. One thinks, for instance, of an 
episode narrated by Levi in Se questo è 
un uomo:  
Accanto a me, serrata come fra 
corpo e corpo, era stata per tutto il 
viaggio una donna. Ci conoscevamo 
da molti anni, e la sventura ci aveva 
colti insieme, ma poco sapevamo 
l’uno dell’altra. Ci dicemmo, allora, 
nell’ora della decisione, cose che 
non si dicono tra i vivi. Ci 
salutammo, e fu breve; ciascuno 
salutò nell’altro la vita. (Levi 1989: 
16) 
Even the narration of the condemned 
final hours prior to deportation does not 
linger on their desperation, but rather 
stays focused on a few everyday and 
necessary activities: packing the 
suitcases, baking focaccia for the 
children, drying clothes on barbed wire. 
The image is all the more true and 
affecting the less it dwells on the pain of 
the other, not making a spectacle of it or 
transforming the reader into a voyeur of 
the horror. Ahead of the train’s departure, 
pity is further enhanced through a 
reticent glance: ‘Many things were then 
said and done between us; but it is 
better that no memory remain of these’ 
(Levi 1989: 14).  
Just as for the representation of the 
other (and his pain), the representation 
of the self entails the risk of 
spectacularization. The person-author 
can become part of that de-realizing 
mechanism triggered by show business: 
the stronger his presence across 
different media, the more the author can 
become, for all ends and purposes, no 
longer a person but an icon created by 
the mass media, and the text nothing 
more than an object of cultural 
consumption. It is no coincidence that 
Roberto Saviano, while being the one 
Italian author who more than any other 
has taken advantage of the power of the 
mass media in order to integrate the 
discourse of the novel, has at the same 
time denounced the dangers of this 
practice. Although mass media have 
unparalleled power to ‘rip through the 
blanket of indifference’, the danger of 
becoming ‘too much of a character’, and 
the loss of legitimacy this entails, is 
always behind the corner. The dilemma 
is essentially the same one that Arbasino 
denounced in his own time in Off-off: ‘is 
making use of existing cultural structures 
not equivalent to being used by them?’ 
(Arbasino 1968: 268).  
It seems to me that the danger of media 
overdetermination is, essentially, what 
Sontag has already denounced as the 
tendency to create a ‘star-witness’ who, 
by attracting the public’s attention to his 
character, effectively obscures the real 
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victims (see Sontag 2003: 33 and 
passim). They become, in this way, mass 
victims – deprived of identity, without a 
name.  
In O Evangelho segundo Jesus Cristo by 
José Saramago there is a passage that 
strikes immediately with its power (in a 
certain sense, by its crudeness): a 
passage filled with almost nothing but 
names. Christ, alone in a boat on a lake, 
begins a conversation with the Father. 
When the Son asks the Father how many 
will die in His name, the latter does not 
restrict his answer to ‘many’, beginning 
instead a long list:  
E depois, Depois, meu filho, jà to 
disse, serà una história interminável 
de fero e de sangue, de fogo e de 
cinzas, un mar infinito de sofrimento 
e de lagrimas, Conta, quero saber 
tudo. Deus suspirou e, no tom 
monocórdico de quem preferiu 
adormecer a piedade e a 
misericórdia, começou a ladainha, 
por orden alfabética para evidar 
melindres de precedȇncias, 
Adalberto de Praga, morto come um 
espontão de sete pontas, Adriano, 
morto à martelada sobre uma 
bigorna, Afra de Asburgo, morta na 
fogueira, Agapito de Preneste, morto 
na fogueira, pendurando pelos pés 
[...] Beatriz de Roma, morta per 
estrangulamento, Benigno de Dijon, 
morto à lançada [...] Juan de Prado, 
apunhalado na cabeça... (Saramago 
1991: 380-83).  
What I want to note here is that it is in 
the moment in which their names are 
pronounced that the victims regain their 
dignity, since it is only at that moment 
that they are recognized in their reality 
as individual and actual beings. It is 
useful at this point to recall Kripke’s 
distinction between common names, 
which are defined by a series of specific 
qualities, and proper names, which is to 
say ‘rigid designators’. Proper names 
always refer to some singularity, 
independent of its multiple qualities and 
of the potentially infinite ways of 
representing it. In the passage cited 
above, knowing the names means for the 
reader knowing the people not in their 
common quality of victims but in their 
singularity, in terms of what specifically 
distinguishes them from all the others. 
The difference is the same as that 
between the description of an 
anonymous mass, with which there can 
be no identification and recognition, and 
the referral to real and singular lives.  
In the already cited Gli ultimi due italiani 
di Kobarid, the autobiographical narrator 
visits the city’s war museum. There he 
admires shell casings and helmets, mess 
kits and flasks, even detailed dioramas 
reproducing troop formations and lines 
of attack. By themselves these exhibits 
are nothing but ‘the curiosities of military 
enthusiasts, one of the most captious 
specializations in history’ (Franchini 
2008: 63). The possibility of an empathic 
relationship with the fallen soldiers at 
Isonzo comes across thanks only to the 
curator, who has enlarged the faces of 
the soldiers in each group photograph 
and replaced them side by side in single 
photographs:  
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Nell’ingresso del museo, sul cortile 
acciottolato, stavano proiettili di 
obice, e su una parete un grande 
pannello che riproduceva i volti dei 
soldati. Quelle facce erano 
particolari ingranditi delle foto di 
gruppo esposte nelle sale, quasi per 
non dimenticarsi che le truppe 
avanzano e retrocedono sui plastici, 
nelle cartine che mostrano 
schieramenti e linee d’attacco, per 
soddisfare la curiosità dei cultori di 
strategia, una delle specializzazioni 
più capziose della storia, ma erano 
fatte di singoli ed erano singoli che 
morivano, e avevano facce e corpi e 
gli stessi identici sogni che 
avremmo avuto noi al loro posto, e 
pensavano cose simili a quelle che, 
messi nelle stesse condizioni, 
penseremmo noi. (Franchini 2008: 
63-4) 
The possibility of a text’s impact depends 
therefore on a fragile equilibrium: if, on 
one hand, it must reveal the human 
experience that is its foundation, the 
represented individuality cannot occupy 
the stage entirely. The contemporary 
writer must additionally manage to 
establish a dialogue with the reader that 
is at once rational and emotive, a 
dialogue that, to use Albinati’s words, is 
given over to ‘a cold passion that is the 
very opposite of sentimentalism. A 
coldness that is roused, open, ready to 
listen’ (Albinati 1999: 63).  
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